The Future Implications for Ag-Gag Laws by Lyons, Jacquelyn M.
LYONS (DO NOT DELETE) 4/16/2017 1:18 PM 
 
915 
THE FUTURE IMPLICATIONS FOR AG-GAG LAWS 
Jacquelyn M. Lyons* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A video begins with a cow lying on her side on a concrete floor, 
one end of a chain wrapped around her neck and the other attached 
to a tractor.1  A man drives the tractor around the floor, down a ramp, 
and outside onto the ground.2  This video, which was recorded at the 
Bettencourt Dairies’ Dry Creek Dairy in Idaho, proceeds to show other 
cows in metal stalls being whipped, punched, and jumped on as they 
attempt to escape their abusers.3  Videos like this one are typically 
recorded by undercover investigators—journalists or animal activists 
who pose as industry workers to blow the whistle on illegal activities 
and, specifically, animal abuse.4  By acquiring and sharing footage of 
animal abuse and unsafe working conditions, the undercover 
investigators hope the public will learn of these atrocities and voice its 
disapproval of the conditions, prompting the authorities to act and 
change to occur within the agricultural industry.5 
Following the release of this video and the ensuing negative 
publicity, the Idaho Dairymen’s Association drafted a bill that 
proposed to criminalize undercover investigations that exposed these 
activities on farms, which the Idaho legislature quickly passed into law 
on February 14, 2014.6  However, on August 3, 2015, an Idaho federal 
district court judge declared the statute unconstitutional in Animal 
Legal Defense Fund v. Otter on the basis of the First Amendment right to 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Lehigh University. 
 1  Idaho Workers Charged with Animal Cruelty at Bettencourt Dairies’ Dry Creek Dairy, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 11, 2012, 1:28 AM), http://landing.newsinc.com/shared/video 
.html?vcid=23841440&freewheel=90051&sitesection=nydailynews. 
 2  Id. 
 3  Id. 
 4  Hiding the Truth About Factory Farms, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/27/opinion/27wed3.html. 
 5  Torment of Dairy Cows in Undercover Video Leads to Cruelty Charges, NBC NEWS (Oct. 
10, 2012, 12:26 PM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/10/10/14343360-
torment-of-dairy-cows-in-undercover-video-leads-to-cruelty-charges?lite. 
 6  Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1199 (D. Idaho 2015). 
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free speech.7 
Not long before Animal Legal Defense Fund, on June 18, 2015, the 
Supreme Court of the United States arguably expanded the definition 
of “content based speech” in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, thus marking an 
“important shift toward treating countless laws that regulate speech 
with exceptional skepticism.”8  The Court addressed a challenge to a 
town code that identified specific categories of signs based on their 
content and subjected those signs to various levels of restriction.9  In 
addition to striking down the ordinance under First Amendment free 
speech principles, Justice Thomas went further to discuss what exactly 
constitutes “content-based speech.”10  Analyses of the opinion interpret 
the ruling to conclude that any law that singles out a topic for 
regulation discriminates based on content, and is, therefore, subject to 
strict scrutiny.11 
This Comment will argue that not only are the majority of “ag-gag 
laws”12 per se unconstitutional, but also that the recent Animal Legal 
Defense Fund decision coupled with the Reed decision should prompt 
the legislative and judiciary systems to reform or strike down the 
remaining ag-gag laws altogether.  Part II of this Comment will look 
generally at how ag-gag laws implicate First Amendment issues.  Part 
III will take an in-depth look into the Idaho statute challenged in 
Animal Legal Defense Fund and pinpoint what the Court specifically 
identified as unconstitutional.  Part IV will consider the impact of the 
Reed decision on ag-gag laws and discuss future implications for 
existing ag-gag laws that arise from considering Animal Legal Defense 
Fund and Reed in tandem, including why the remaining statutes cannot 
survive strict scrutiny.  Part V will conclude by recommending actions 
that can be taken by the legislature and judiciary to combat these 
unconstitutional statutes. 
 
 7  Id. at 1199–200. 
 8  Adam Liptak, Court’s Free-Speech Expansion Has Far Reaching Consequences, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/us/politics/courts-
free-speech-expansion-has-far-reaching-consequences.html; Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 
135 S. Ct. 2218, 2232 (2015). 
 9  Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2224. 
 10  Id. at 2227. 
 11  Liptak, supra note 8. 
 12  Ag-gag refers to state laws that prohibit the act of undercover filming or 
photography of activity on farms without the owner’s consent. What is Ag-Gag 
Legislation?, AM. SOC’Y FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS, https://www.aspca 
.org/animal-cruelty/factory-farms/what-ag-gag-legislation (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).  
Ag-gag laws particularly target undercover journalists or whistleblowers of animal 
rights abuses at these facilities. Id. 
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II. ESTABLISHING THE BASIS FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL CONNECTION TO 
AG-GAG LAWS 
The term “ag-gag” refers to agricultural operation “gag laws,” or 
laws that restrict freedom of the press and free speech.13  While ag-gag 
laws vary in their structure and specificity, they typically criminalize 
undercover investigations of any agricultural operations, such as dairy, 
poultry, and pork farms.14  The ag-gag laws generally target three 
categories: (1) dishonesty in the job-application process, when the 
applicant has the intention of infiltrating the facility to investigate; (2) 
photographing or videotaping on agricultural facilities; and (3) the 
possession or distribution of such videos.15  Although ag-gag laws take 
various forms, they ultimately share a similar goal: to stop 
whistleblowers from revealing what occurs at agricultural facilities.16 
Objections to these ag-gag statutes largely stem from the First 
Amendment right to freedom of speech.17  Indeed, the effect of many 
of these ag-gag statutes is a suppression of speech of undercover 
investigators and whistleblowers, which not only affects the treatment 
and health of farm animals, but also public safety, agricultural worker 
safety, and the environment.18  This suppression of speech directly 
implicates issues under the First Amendment, which states, “Congress 
shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”19  Courts should 
find that the medium and content of the speech are protected by the 
First Amendment, and they should utilize a strict scrutiny standard to 
review ag-gag laws. 
First, the medium of video recordings is protected speech under 
the First Amendment.20  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, in Cuviello v. City of Oakland, utilized a framework to 
specifically identify when the right to videotape was protected by free 
 
 13  Id. 
 14  Id. 
 15  Kevin C. Adam, Shooting the Messenger: A Common-Sense Analysis of State “Ag-Gag” 
Legislation Under the First Amendment, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1129, 1131 (2012). 
 16  Traci Hobson, Factory Farming in America, Part 4: The Proliferation of Ag-Gag 
Legislation, IAN SOMERHALDER FOUND. (Apr. 25, 2016), http://www.isfoundation.com/ 
campaign/factory-farming-america-part-4-proliferation-ag-gag-legislation. 
 17  See Kurt Michael Friese, Gagging on the Ag Gag Bill - Industrial Lobbying and 
Corporate Overreach at Its Finest, HUFFINGTON POST (June 7, 2011), http://www.huffing 
tonpost.com/kurt-friese/farm-animal-abuse_b_872867.html. 
 18  Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1201 (D. Idaho 2015). 
 19  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 20  Cuviello v. City of Oakland, No. C-06-5517 MHP, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59833, 
at *7–8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2007), aff’d, 434 F. App’x 615 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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speech.21  In Cuviello, a group of animal-rights activists were stopped as 
they stood on an access ramp to photograph and videotape the 
treatment of circus animals in a public facility.22  The court ruled that 
the activists were exercising their right to free speech because they 
were communicating the treatment of animals to the public and the 
public was interested in this communication, thus confirming the 
notion that communication via video is a constitutionally protected 
medium of speech.23  Therefore, the majority of ag-gag laws, which 
prohibit videotaping on private agricultural property, implicate issues 
of protected speech. 
Second, the content contained in the video recordings is 
protected speech under the First Amendment.  These videos depicting 
animal abuse do not fall into any of the categories of unprotected 
speech and should accordingly remain protected.24  The unprotected 
categories of speech include obscenity,25 incitement,26 and fighting 
words.27  Proponents of ag-gag laws may argue that lies should not be 
protected speech; however, courts have held that lies are not 
categorically outside First Amendment protection.28  Accordingly, 
typical undercover investigation videos that depict the mistreatment of 
animals and are released by journalists and animal rights activists do 
not fall under any of these traditional unprotected categories.29 
Third, strict scrutiny should apply under this First Amendment 
analysis because the ag-gag laws are content based.  Laws that are 
content based must be reviewed under strict scrutiny, and the law must 
be found to be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental 
interest.30  Although Reed did not deal with the agricultural industry, 
this decision arguably broadened the scope of the constitutional 
connection to ag-gag laws.  An argument could be made that laws were 
previously content based if they were adopted to suppress speech with 
 
 21  Id. 
 22  Id. at *2–3. 
 23  Id. at *21–22. 
 24  Sonci Kingery, Note, The Agricultural Iron Curtain: Ag Gag Legislation and the 
Threat to Free Speech, Food Safety, and Animal Welfare, 17 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 645, 664 
(2012). 
 25  See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).  
 26  See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969). 
 27  See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). 
 28  See discussion infra Part III. 
 29  Kingery, supra note 24, at 671–72. 
 30  United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (quoting Sable 
Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)) (“If a statute regulates speech 
based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling 
Government interest.”). 
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which the government disagreed.31 
Yet, the Reed decision either modified or confirmed “content 
based” to mean that any law that singles out a topic for regulation 
discriminates based on content, and is, therefore, presumptively 
unconstitutional.32  This could potentially create a new framework to 
look at many statutes that target a specific topic, including the 
agricultural industry.  The legislative history of ag-gag statutes strongly 
indicates that the purpose of the statutes is to suppress speech critical 
of animal-agricultural practices, thus rendering the statute regulations 
content based.33 
Specifically, the Idaho statute was enacted as a reaction to the 
release of a video depicting animal abuse.  Idaho senators compared 
animal rights investigators to “marauding invaders centuries ago who 
swarmed into foreign territory and destroyed crops to starve foes into 
submission.”34  The senator also referred to the investigation as 
“terrorism,” and stated, “[t]his is the way you combat your enemies” 
while defending the legislation.35  It is likely that a video showing an 
agricultural facility in a positive light would not lead to the same legal 
action and consequences as negative videos because the “victim” will 
not incur any losses.  However, since a negative video would likely cause 
the victim to suffer losses due to public outcry from the mistreatment 
of animals and workers, this negative depiction is the discernable 
target of the ag-gag laws.  This legislative and historical basis for the ag-
gag laws implies that the statutes are directly intended to punish 
animal activists and whistleblowers and are targeting speech that is 
critical of agricultural production facilities.  Therefore, it is likely that 
courts will find that ag-gag laws single out and regulate the topic of 
negative views of the agricultural industry, thus triggering a strict 
scrutiny standard. 
Finally, there are public policy concerns that demonstrate the 
importance of a First Amendment inquiry.  Specifically, the story of 
Upton Sinclair is a “clear illustration” of how ag-gag statutes implicate 
constitutional issues grounded in the First Amendment.36  Sinclair 
obtained a job in the meat packing industry to acquire information for 
a novel revealing unsanitary working conditions, and the atrocities he 
 
 31  See Liptak, supra note 8. 
 32  Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2222 (2015). 
 33  See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1201 (D. Idaho 
2015). 
 34  Id. at 1200. 
 35  Id. 
 36  Id. at 1201. 
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uncovered ultimately led to the passage of the Pure Food and Drug 
Act.37  Under nearly every ag-gag statute today, including the Idaho 
statute, Sinclair would have been criminally prosecuted for his 
conduct, either for obtaining employment under misrepresentation or 
false pretenses or for publishing photographs of the animal facility.38  
This story illustrates how agricultural operations that “affect food and 
worker safety are not exclusively a private matter.”39  Without the 
information obtained by undercover investigators, which is prohibited 
under the current ag-gag laws, the public will likely never learn of 
unsanitary or abusive conditions for animals or workers at agricultural 
facilities.  It is not probable that an agricultural facility will permit 
members of the public to witness animal abuse or unsafe working 
conditions that occur at their facility. 
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF IDAHO’S UNCONSTITUTIONAL AG-GAG LAW 
The Idaho ag-gag statute, Idaho Code § 18-7042, criminalizes 
“interference with agricultural production.”40  The statute provides, in 
pertinent part, that a person commits this crime if the person 
knowingly: (a) enters an agricultural production facility by force, 
threat, misrepresentation or trespass; (b) obtains agricultural 
production facility records by force, threat, misrepresentation or 
trespass; (c) obtains employment with an agricultural production 
facility by force, threat, or misrepresentation with the intent to cause 
economic or other injury to the facility’s operations; (d) enters a 
private agricultural production facility and, without the facility owner’s 
express consent, makes audio or video recordings of the conduct of an 
agricultural production facility’s operations.41  Violators of the statute face 
up to one year in jail, and a journalist or whistleblower convicted can 
be forced to pay damages for twice the economic loss a business suffers 
as a result of any exposé revealing animal abuse or unsafe working 
conditions.42 
The court in Animal Legal Defense Fund lays out the steps to a First 
Amendment challenge to ag-gag laws: (1) Plaintiff bears the burden of 
“demonstrating that the First Amendment applies to the activity he or 
 
 37  Joe McGasko, Dispatches from the Jungle: The Writers Who Reformed America, 
BIOGRAPHY (Feb. 26, 2016), http://www.biography.com/news/the-jungle-upton-
sinclair-whistleblowers-muckrakers. 
 38  Animal Legal Def. Fund, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1201–02. 
 39  Id. at 1202. 
 40  IDAHO CODE § 18-7042 (2015). 
 41  IDAHO CODE § 18-7042(1)(a)-(e) (2015) (emphasis added). 
 42  Animal Legal Def. Fund, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1201. 
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she claims is protected as expression;”43 (2) the court analyzes the 
context in which the expression took place and then determines which 
First Amendment standard applies;44 (3) the court then assesses 
whether the government’s justifications for restricting the conduct or 
speech satisfy the applicable standard.45 
A. Animal Legal Defense Fund Found That Using Misrepresentation to 
Gain Access to Agricultural Facilities is Protected by the First 
Amendment 
First, under the framework of First Amendment ag-gag 
challenges, the plaintiff must establish that the prohibited activity is 
protected under the First Amendment.46  Thus, the court analyzed 
whether the “misrepresentation” requirement included in sections (a)-
(c) of the statute was a violation of the First Amendment.47  The Animal 
Legal Defense Fund court utilized the analysis presented in United States 
v. Alvarez.48  In Alvarez, the central issue was whether lies are 
categorically outside First Amendment protection.49  The Alvarez Court 
struck down a federal statute that made it a crime to misrepresent or 
lie about receiving military decorations or medals on the ground that 
it violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.50  The 
plurality found that “there must be a direct causal link between the 
restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented.”51  The Court 
explained that it rejected the Government’s claim because there was 
no sufficient link between lies about military awards and the dilution 
of the public’s perception of such honors, which was the asserted 
harm.52 
The Alvarez holding is critical in ag-gag cases because ag-gag laws 
are framed to punish actions, including the recording of video, which 
occur after a misrepresentation, specifically regarding an individual’s 
identity.  Based on the majority of ag-gag laws’ inclusion of a section 
requiring misrepresentation to gain employment, agricultural facilities 
 
 43  Id. at 1202 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 
n.5 (1984)). 
 44  Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985). 
 45  Id. 
 46  Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 n.5 (1984). 
 47  Animal Legal Def. Fund, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1203. 
 48  Id. 
 49  United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543 (2012). 
 50  Id. at 2551. 
 51  Id. at 2549. 
 52  Alan K. Chen & Justin Marceau, High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First 
Amendment, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1435, 1452 (2015). 
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may include questions on employment applications asking if potential 
employees are pursuing employment in order to make unauthorized 
recordings.53  Potential employees could face charges under certain ag-
gag statutes54 just by misrepresenting themselves on this application 
with the intent to make unauthorized recordings, even if they never 
actually make an unauthorized recording.55  The Alvarez Court 
importantly noted that the public has an interest in First Amendment 
protection for false speech.56  Moreover, if the government has power 
to punish false speech, this will lead to a chilling of free speech 
stemming from the selective enforcement of the law against certain 
groups.57 
In Animal Legal Defense Fund, the State argued that the Alvarez 
ruling did not apply to the Idaho statute because, unlike in Alvarez, the 
“misrepresentations” in the Idaho statute only become criminal when 
accompanied by a form of conduct such as “entering a facility, 
acquiring its records, or seeking employment with the express purpose 
of doing harm to the employer.”58  The Animal Legal Defense Fund court, 
however, clarified that Alvarez did not strike down the statute because 
it was not accompanied by conduct, but rather because the false 
statements did not cause a “legally cognizable harm.”59  Certain 
deceptive speech, such as perjury, fraud, and defamation, directly 
causes material harm to those being misled.60  Since these types of 
speech can directly cause material harm to individuals, the statutory 
criminalization of these actions does not violate the First 
Amendment.61  The court clarified that the Idaho statute is not limited 
to directly harmful misrepresentation, but rather it prohibited “all lies 
used to gain access to property, records, or employment—regardless 
 
 53  Larissa U. Liebmann, Fraud and First Amendment Protections of False Speech: How 
United States v. Alvarez Impacts Constitutional Challenges to Ag-Gag Laws, 31 PACE ENVTL. 
L. REV. 566, 569 (2014). 
 54  IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.2(1) (West 2013). 
 55  Liebmann, supra note 53, at 569. 
 56  United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2553 (2012) (“[T]he threat of criminal 
prosecution for making a false statement can inhibit the speaker from making true 
statements, thereby ‘chilling’ a kind of speech that lies at the First Amendment’s 
heart.”). 
 57  Id. 
 58  Defendant Wasden’s Response to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 9–
10, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195 (D. Idaho 2015) (No. 1:14-
cv-00104-BLW). 
 59  Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1203 (D. Idaho 2015) 
(quoting Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2545). 
 60  Id. 
 61  Id. 
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of whether the misrepresentations themselves cause any material 
harm.”62  Ag-gag laws reach far beyond laws prohibiting fraud, invasions 
of privacy, or physical damage, which is harm that is not shielded by 
free speech.63  In fact, the criminalized conduct of ag-gag laws does not 
have to cause any injury other than the recording and exposure of 
illegal or otherwise repugnant actions.64 
In the case of the Idaho statute65 and likely in the case of many 
other ag-gag laws, the harm would emerge later from the story or video 
that is shared with the public, but the harm is not directly caused by 
the misrepresentation made to gain access to the farm.  In fact, the 
Animal Legal Defense Fund court articulated that exposing this 
misconduct to the public and “facilitating dialogue on issues of 
considerable public interest” is precisely the type of speech the First 
Amendment is designed to protect.66  Thus, like in Alvarez, a court 
deciding the constitutionality of an ag-gag law will not likely find a 
sufficient link between misrepresenting oneself to obtain employment 
and the harm of public disapproval of agricultural industry actions. 
The misrepresentation component of the Animal Legal Defense 
Fund case is important, and it has far-reaching implications regarding 
other ag-gag laws.  Common sense can deduce that an agricultural 
facility owner with abuse occurring on the premises would not 
welcome an investigator, animal activist, or journalist to step foot on 
the property or record video of the animal abuse.  Therefore, one of 
the limited ways these individuals can obtain access onto the property 
is by misrepresenting their identity.  If the court upheld the 
“misrepresentation” prohibitions in this statute, the far-reaching 
consequences may extend to all investigative journalism altogether. 
B. Animal Legal Defense Fund Found That the Audiovisual Recording 
Prohibitions Restrict Speech Protected by the First Amendment and 
Discriminate Based on Content and Viewpoint 
Next, the Animal Legal Defense Fund court looked at the audiovisual 
recording prohibition in Section D.67  The court decided that the 
specific provision not only restricted a medium protected by free 
speech,68 but also discriminated against speech on content and 
 
 62  Id. 
 63  Chen & Marceau, supra note 52, at 1470. 
 64  Id. 
 65  IDAHO CODE § 18-7042 (2015). 
 66  Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1204 (D. Idaho 2015). 
 67  Id. 
 68  See discussion supra Part II. 
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viewpoint.69  As established in Cuviello, video recordings are regarded 
as expressive activities that are entitled to First Amendment 
protection.70  Furthermore, Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission 
held that “laws enacted to control or suppress speech may operate at 
different parts in the speech process.”71  Thus, laws concerning 
suppression of speech are implicated even during the beginning stages 
of gathering information that will later be used as speech.  The Animal 
Legal Defense Fund court indicated that prohibiting undercover 
investigators from recording misconduct in agricultural facilities 
suppresses a “key type of speech because it limits the information that 
might later be published or broadcast,” which is often important for 
animal activists and whistleblowers to establish proof, as well as 
credibility.72 
This aspect of the decision is exceedingly important in our society 
because video recordings exposing illegal or disturbing activity are 
increasingly prevalent.  These types of videos have the purpose and 
ability to spark outrage, conversation, and eventual steps toward social 
change and evolution.  If recording video of specific activities is not 
protected speech, the very notion of free speech in America may be 
diminished.  In other words, if a court upholds a statute prohibiting 
the recording of animal abuse on private property without the owner’s 
consent, what would stop that same court from upholding a 
hypothetical statute that prohibits recording video of violence at a 
private workplace? 
Additionally, the court found that the ban on audiovisual 
recordings of an explicit topic, specifically the “conduct of an 
agricultural production facility’s operations,” is particularly dangerous 
because it is content based.73  The court identified content-based laws 
as laws where “either the underlying purpose of the regulation is to 
suppress particular ideas, or if the regulation, by its very terms, singles 
out particular content for differential treatment.”74  The court 
concluded that the Idaho statute “target[ed] undercover investigators 
who intend to publish videos they make through the press and 
[sought] to suppress speech critical of animal agricultural practices.”75  
 
 69  Animal Legal Def. Fund, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1207. 
 70  Cuviello v. City of Oakland, No. C-06-5517 MHP, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59833, 
at *7–8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2007), aff’d, 434 F. App’x 615 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 71  Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 336 (2010). 
 72  Animal Legal Def. Fund, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1204. 
 73  See id. at 1205. 
 74  Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1051 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 75  Animal Legal Def. Fund, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1202. 
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Further, the Idaho statute targets speech concerning the conduct of 
an agricultural production facility’s operations.76  The plaintiffs 
claimed that the Idaho statute had the “purpose and effect of stifling 
public debate about modern agriculture . . . .”77  The court agreed, 
noting that the law plainly sought to “limit and punish those who speak 
out on topics relating to the agricultural industry, striking at the heart 
of important First Amendment values.”78  The court was not persuaded 
by the argument that the statute regulated conduct as opposed to 
speech.79 
The court illustrated the content-based nature of the statute by 
citing McCullen v. Coakley, which upheld a statute that merely restricted 
speech depending on where something was said—specifically an 
abortion clinic buffer zone—as opposed to what was being said.80  
Unlike the statute upheld in McCullen, the statute here is directly 
reliant upon speech in the form of audiovisual recordings collected at 
agricultural industry facilities.81  Notably, a violation would not occur if 
an employee stood inside an agricultural production facility and 
filmed the owner having a conversation with his spouse; however, if 
that same employee filmed workers abusing animals, the employee 
could be prosecuted and face up to a year in jail and be liable for 
reputational harm to the owner.82  This highlights the statute’s content 
based prohibitive effect because it specifically targets and monitors the 
content of the speech, which—here—is animal abuse. 
Future courts can also look to Alvarez in their analysis of whether 
or not ag-gag laws prohibit content based speech: 
The government’s contention in Alvarez, that the Stolen 
Valor Act is similar to a federal statute prohibiting lying to a 
government official, supports the conclusion that Ag-Gag 
laws are content-based restrictions on speech . . . .  If a statute 
criminalizing lying to a government official is considered a 
content-based restriction, then, naturally, laws criminalizing 
lying on an employment application are also content-based 
restrictions.83 
 
 
 76  IDAHO CODE § 18-7042 (2015). 
 77  Animal Legal Def. Fund, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1199. 
 78  See id. at 1201.  
 79  Id. at 1202. 
 80  Id. at 1205 (citing McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014)). 
 81  See IDAHO CODE § 18-7042. 
 82  Animal Legal Def. Fund, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1205–06. 
 83  Liebmann, supra note 53, at 578. 
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C. Animal Legal Defense Fund Found the Statute to be a Content Based 
Restriction on Free Speech, and, Therefore, Applied Strict Scrutiny 
Since the Animal Legal Defense Fund court accordingly found that 
the Idaho statute is a content based restriction on protected speech, 
the court applied the highest level of constitutional scrutiny: strict 
scrutiny.84  To pass strict scrutiny, the legislature must have narrowly 
tailored the law to further a compelling governmental interest.85  Thus, 
the court discussed the asserted governmental interests of the State in 
favor of the statute.86  The State claimed the Idaho statute was passed 
in order to “protect private property and the privacy of agricultural 
facility owners.”87  The court ultimately found that the State’s interest 
in protecting personal privacy and private property is an important 
interest, but not a compelling interest in the context presented.88  The 
court indicated that “historic and traditional categories of expression” 
that are not protected by the First Amendment based on compelling 
government interests include “obscenity, ‘fighting words,’ defamation, 
and child pornography.”89 
Further, the court relied on Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. 
F.C.C., which stated that “[i]t is not enough for the goals of the law to 
be legitimate or reasonable” in order to pass strict scrutiny.90  “There 
must be some pressing public necessity, some essential value that has to 
be preserved; and even then the law must restrict as little speech as 
possible to serve the goal.”91  The State in Animal Legal Defense Fund 
failed to assert why agricultural production facilities require 
heightened protection from these privacy-related crimes.92  
Additionally, the court recognized the public’s interest in the safety of 
food supply, worker safety, and the humane treatment of animals.93  
The court said that “[p]rotecting the private interests of a powerful 
industry, which produces the public’s food supply, against public 
scrutiny is not a legitimate government interest.”94 
Furthermore, a combination of the statute’s legislative history and 
overall construction makes it clear that the statute is aimed at 
 
 84  Animal Legal Def. Fund, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1202–03.  
 85  See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 680 (1994). 
 86  Animal Legal Def. Fund, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1202. 
 87  Id. 
 88  Id. at 1207. 
 89  Id. (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2539 (2012). 
 90  Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 680. 
 91  Id. (emphasis added). 
 92  Animal Legal Def. Fund, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1207. 
 93  Id. 
 94  Id. at 1210. 
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preventing individuals from sharing information about abuse at 
factory farms to avoid backlash from the public.95  Yet, certain statutes 
that have been introduced in states such as Nebraska, Indiana, and 
Wyoming, and passed in states like Missouri96 are constructed to 
portray the idea that the state’s main concern is the welfare of the 
animals at these agricultural facilities.  The same argument was made 
in Animal Legal Defense Fund, regarding the Iowa statute.97  Supporters 
of the ag-gag law alleged that the undercover investigators failed to 
report animal abuse to the dairy operator or the authorities, thus 
“allowing additional animal abuse to occur and depriving the animals 
of immediate care and treatment.”98  These states form the law under 
the pretext that they want the footage to be turned over right away to 
prevent any further abuse to the animals.  This process prevents the 
long-term collection of evidence to show patterns of consistent abuse, 
thereby hindering the prosecution of the abusers at a later time.  
Animal rights advocates argue this hampers their ability to build a 
comprehensive case.99 
Additionally, the practical effect of these statutes is that these 
videos and long-term investigations are not communicated to the 
public, thus stifling the free speech of the animal activists and 
whistleblowers.  Moreover, the statute is not narrowly tailored to 
achieve the protection of privacy because other laws exist that 
adequately address this interest.100  There are existing laws against 
trespass, fraud, theft, and defamation that protect against privacy 
invasion and are narrowly tailored to that interest without encroaching 
on free speech.101 
IV. UTILIZING REED V. TOWN OF GILBERT TO STRIKE DOWN AG-GAG 
LAWS 
While the Animal Legal Defense Fund court did not cite Reed in their 
opinion, it is likely that future courts will look to Reed to categorize 
other ag-gag laws, or the purpose and justification of other ag-gag laws, 
as content based.  Floyd Abrams, a constitutional lawyer, said Reed 
 
 95  Id. at 1206. 
 96  S. B. 631, 2012 Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012). 
 97  Animal Legal Def. Fund, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1199. 
 98  Id. 
 99  Mike McGraw, ‘Ag-gag’ Law May Have Hindered Report of Animal Cruelty at Missouri 
Hog Farm, HARVEST PUB. MEDIA (Oct. 2, 2014), http://harvestpublicmedia.org/article/ 
ag-gag-law-may-have-hindered-report-animal-cruelty-missouri-hog-farm. 
 100  Animal Legal Def. Fund, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1208. 
 101  Id. 
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“provides significantly enhanced protection for free speech while 
requiring a second look at the constitutionality of aspects of federal 
and state securities laws, the federal Communications Act and many 
others.”102  Robert Post, the dean of Yale Law School, said the decision’s 
logic “endangered all sorts of laws, including ones that regulate 
misleading advertising and professional malpractice.”103  Still, others 
maintain that Reed merely “affirm[ed] that the government cannot ban 
speech based on ‘the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed’ 
unless it has a compelling interest.”104  Although prominent legal minds 
differ in their reactions to the decision, most agree that it will have 
influential and significant effects on laws that regulate speech.105  
Accordingly, Reed will likely be utilized in future cases challenging ag-
gag laws. 
Specifically, if future courts are not persuaded by the application 
of the content-based statute conclusion in Animal Legal Defense Fund, 
they may look to Reed.  In Reed, Justice Clarence Thomas concluded 
that many laws are now subject to the highest level of review: strict 
scrutiny.106  “Speech regulation is content based if a law applies to 
particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message 
expressed . . . .  Whether laws define regulated speech by particular 
subject matter or by its function or purpose, they are subject to strict 
scrutiny.”107  Even if speech does not discriminate among viewpoints 
within a subject matter, a speech regulation targeted at any specific 
subject matter is content based.108 
Prior to Reed, courts established that government regulation of 
speech is content based if the law pertains to specific speech because 
of the topic, idea, or message.  Thus, with this decision, the Reed court 
is at least reaffirming the broad prohibition on content based speech 
restrictions.  Reed clarifies further that a law is content based if it 
specifically addresses a topic, idea, or message “on its face” or draws 
distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys.109  Further, strict 
scrutiny applies either when a law is content based on its face or when 
 
 102  See Liptak, supra note 8. 
 103  Id. 
 104  David A. Cortman, Supreme Court Decision Ensures Fair Playing Field in Marketplace 
of Ideas, JURIST (Aug. 4, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://jurist.org/hotline/2015/08/david-
cortman-freedom-of-speech.php. 
 105  Id.  
 106  Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (2015). 
 107  Id. at 2222. 
 108  Id. at 2230. 
 109  See id. at 2227. 
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the purpose and justification for the law are content based.110  Laws that 
are found to be content based must undergo strict scrutiny by the 
court.111 
Since many of the ag-gag laws are worded similarly to the Idaho 
statute, it is likely that a court will rely on both the ALDF and Reed cases 
when framing its analysis of what standard applies in an ag-gag 
challenge.  Further, the majority of the ag-gag laws target undercover 
investigators intending to publish videos of activities at agricultural 
facilities.112  In terms of future challenges to statutes that suppress 
speech that is specifically critical of the animal agriculture industry, it 
is more than likely that courts will find that strict scrutiny applies due 
to content-based motives and structure.  This type of scrutiny will make 
it exceedingly difficult for these ag-gag laws to survive a First 
Amendment challenge, since Justice Thomas held that any law that 
singles out a topic for regulation discriminates based on content and 
is therefore “presumptively unconstitutional.”113 
A. Why Existing Ag-Gag Laws Cannot Survive Strict Scrutiny 
Due to the holding that the Idaho statute is content based, and 
thus analyzed by the court under the strict scrutiny test,114 it is likely 
that the remaining ag-gag statute challenges will be decided similarly.  
The structure of the remaining ag-gag laws is similar to the Idaho 
statute, aside from the North Carolina “anti-sunshine” statute.115 
The Utah statute prohibits gaining access to agricultural 
operations through misrepresentation, as well as intentionally 
recording images or sound from the agricultural operation.116  Since 
the Utah statute117 is generally worded the same as the Idaho statute,118 
it will likely be struck down because it is content based, there is no 
compelling governmental interest behind the statute, and the statute 
is not narrowly tailored to achieve the asserted interest. 
 
 110  Id. at 2222. 
 111  See discussion infra Part II. 
 112  See, e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195 (D. Idaho 2015). 
 113  Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015). 
 114  See discussion supra Part III. 
 115  See discussion infra Part IV (A). 
 116  UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(2) (LexisNexis 2015). 
 117  See id. 
 118  See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042 (2015). 
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The Iowa,119 Kansas,120 North Dakota,121 and Montana122 statutes all 
essentially prohibit individuals from producing, possessing, or 
distributing photographs, videos, or any recordings taken at an animal 
facility without permission.  It is likely that these statutes will undergo 
strict scrutiny because the specificity of “animal facility” constitutes 
content based suppression of speech under the framework of Animal 
Legal Defense Fund combined with the broadened category provided by 
Reed.  Just as in Animal Legal Defense Fund, a court would not likely find 
the use of a compelling governmental interest because the public 
interest in knowledge of its food supply and safety is much greater than 
the government’s interest in protecting the agricultural facilities from 
communal backlash regarding animal abuse.  Furthermore, more 
narrowly tailored privacy laws exist to promote the agricultural 
facilities’ interests in protecting their privacy and property.123 
The Missouri statute mandates that employees of animal 
agricultural operations who videotape animal abuse must turn over the 
footage to law enforcement within twenty-four hours.124  Regardless of 
the motives behind this statute, it is important to address its 
constitutionality under the First Amendment framework.  First, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate that the First Amendment applies to the 
activity that is claimed to be protected.125  As discussed, video 
communication is protected under the First Amendment,126 and 
therefore, the video footage referenced in the statute is protected 
under the First Amendment’s freedom of speech principles.  However, 
it is possible that the court’s inquiry will end here because the statute 
is not actually restricting or prohibiting the speech.  Rather, the statute 
requires that “employees of animal agricultural operations who 
videotape what they suspect is animal abuse must provide the 
recording to a law enforcement agency within [twenty-four] hours.”127  
Since the Supreme Court of the United States determined that 
preventing animal cruelty is not a compelling governmental interest, 
courts are not likely to uphold statutes that require or compel the 
reporting of animal cruelty.128  This has additional implications for 
 
 119  IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.3A (West 2013). 
 120  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(c)(4) (West 2013). 
 121  N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-21.1-02 (West 2013). 
 122  MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-103(2)(e) (West 2013). 
 123  See discussion supra Part III.C. 
 124  S. B. 631, 2012 Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2012). 
 125  Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). 
 126  See What is Ag-Gag Legislation?, supra note 12. 
 127  S. B. 631, 2012 Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2012). 
 128  See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 545–46 
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future ag-gag cases where the State may argue that the content-based 
speech restriction is narrowly tailored to further the compelling 
governmental interest of preventing animal abuse. 
Still, the reporting requirement prevents the collection of 
evidence to show actual patterns of abuse, thus hindering the 
prosecution of the abusers.129  It is likely that the individual will be 
forced to leave his or her job at the agricultural facility after he or she 
blows the whistle on the organization.  If that is the case, the statute 
has the effect of regulating the extent to which individuals can film the 
abuse and ultimately limits the message individuals can share with 
society regarding the particular topic of agricultural industry abuse. 
The Wyoming statute makes it a crime to “knowingly or 
intentionally” record images or sounds of an agricultural operation 
with concealed devices without the owner’s consent.130  In this way, the 
statute will likely undergo, but fail, strict scrutiny because of its 
similarity to the Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, North Dakota, and Montana 
statutes.  The statute additionally states that anyone who reports the 
abuse to police within forty-eight hours is immune from civil liability.131  
While this portion of the statute closely mirrors the Missouri statute, it 
only does so in a civil sense, and does not afford any protection from 
criminal liability.  Thus, it still serves to regulate and prohibit free 
speech that has already been established as protected under free 
speech principles. 
Lastly, a statute in North Carolina, which took effect on January 
1, 2016, prohibits individuals from gaining access to the non-public 
area of their employer’s property for the purpose of making secret 
recordings or removing data or other material.132  The law is different 
from any of the previous ag-gag laws because it creates a civil cause of 
action, allowing a business to sue for damages.133  This law technically 
does not criminalize whistleblowers; however, it allows employers to 
pursue civil charges against employees who take photographs or videos 
and holds them responsible for any damages incurred, as well as up to 
$5,000 per day in punitive damages.134  Further, the statute does not 
 
(1993). 
 129  McGraw, supra note 99. 
 130  H. B. 126, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wyo. 2016). 
 131  Id.  
 132  Will Potter, Breaking: New Ag-Gag Bill Introduced in North Carolina on Same Day 
Butterball Worker Pleads Guilty to Cruelty, GREEN IS THE NEW RED (Apr. 8, 2013), 
http://www.greenisthenewred.com/blog/north-carolina-ag-gag-whistleblower-
law/6851/. 
 133  Id. 
 134  Id. 
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single-out the agricultural industry,135 thus it is unlikely that a court 
would find the statute to be content based.  This statute, like the 
Missouri statute, is slightly more likely to be upheld, but potential far-
reaching consequences still exist. 
On January 13, 2016, a complaint was filed in federal court by 
animal rights and consumer groups, including Animal Legal Defense 
Fund, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, and the Center for 
Food Safety, claiming the North Carolina ag-gag statute was 
unconstitutional.136  The plaintiffs contended that the ag-gag law 
violated rights to free speech, to free press, to petition our 
government, and the Equal Protection Clause.137  The plaintiffs further 
alleged that the statute was not generally applicable, and would not 
create liability for all employees.138  Rather, the statute targeted 
“whistleblowers, such as investigative journalists and activists engaged 
in undercover investigations, who seek to share information with the 
public.”139  In addition, the plaintiffs pointed out that the North 
Carolina law, in addition to factory farms, can potentially include other 
industries such as nursing homes, financial institutions, and daycare 
centers.140  Thus, the law has the potential to punish the reporting of 
abuse or misconduct in any of these places.  Further, the complaint 
alleged that the statute “targets and disproportionately burdens the 
press.”141  These infringements are “presumptively unconstitutional, 
requiring the state to carry a significant burden in order to preserve 
the statute, which it cannot do here.”142 
Perhaps indicative of the fate of the North Carolina statute, a 
similarly written Tennessee statute died in the state’s legislature.143  The 
Tennessee statute, similar to the North Carolina statute, aimed to 
punish whistleblowers that attempted to expose employer wrongdoing 
 
 135  Id. 
 136  Dan Flynn, Activists Challenge NC’s New ‘Ag-Gag’ Law in Federal Court, FOOD SAFETY 
NEWS (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2016/01/north-carolinas-new-
ag-gag-law-challenged-in-federal-court/#.VqBMDz_MtMs. 
 137  See Complaint at 1, PETA v. Cooper, (M.D.N.C. 2016), (No. 16-cv-25) 
[hereinafter Cooper Complaint],  http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/files/nc-
complaint-file-stamped_06044.pdf. 
 138  Id. at 2. 
 139  Id.  
 140  Id. 
 141  Id. at 3. 
 142  Id. at 3. 
 143  Sarah Damian, Tennessee’s Ag Gag (Modeled After North Carolina Law) Didn’t Last 
Long, FOOD INTEGRITY CAMPAIGN (Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.foodwhistleblower.org/ 
tennessees-ag-gag-modeled-after-north-carolina-law-didnt-live-long-986/.  
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in all industries.144  Animal activists urge the public to see the laws for 
what they are—attacks on free speech and transparency—even though 
the agricultural industry attempts to redesign the statutes to look as 
though they are not.145  In North Carolina, the legislature failed to pass 
an ag-gag law twice before because the law singled out factory farm 
exposés, but they quickly reframed the law to cover all industries.146  
Thus, it appears the legislature eluded the issues implicated when they 
attempted to regulate content-based speech.  North Carolina 
Governor Pat McCrory vetoed the redesigned statute because he 
feared it would make it more difficult for employees to report illegal 
activity, but the veto was overruled by the state’s legislature.147  Even 
with changes to the content-based aspects of the law, the “outcry that 
follows revelations about factory farms has led to important policy 
changes.”148  Important changes include California’s 2008 initiative to 
ban specific types of confinement of farm animals.149 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is likely that the majority of existing ag-gag laws will be found to 
be unconstitutional if challenged, due to their content-based nature 
(limited to critical speech on agricultural activity); however, those laws 
which merely require the reporting of animal abuse to the authorities 
will have a tougher time succeeding in a constitutional challenge. 
This Comment recommends that states with the goal of 
protecting privacy at agricultural operations utilize the privacy 
protection laws already available without prohibiting video recordings.  
However, if states find it increasingly important to specifically regulate 
these video recordings, the least intrusive and potentially most 
constitutional resolution is to require individuals who record animal 
abuse to turn the footage over to the police after a specified time 
period without requiring the individual to identify themselves publicly.  
Under this suggestion, if the individual had obtained employment at 
the agricultural facility, he or she could potentially continue his or her 
 
 144  Id. 
 145  Id. 
 146  Editorial Board, No More Exposés in North Carolina, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/01/opinion/no-more-exposes-in-north-
carolina.html?_r=2. 
 147  Id. 
 148  Id. 
 149  Jesse McKinley, A California Ballot Measure Offers Rights for Farm Animals, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 23, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/us/24egg.html 
(explaining that an animal rights ballot measure grants California farm animals the 
opportunity to spread out instead of being confined to restrictive cages).  
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work there after any investigation by the authority.  Therefore, the 
individuals can continue to watch for animal abuse or other 
infractions, as well as communicate any message about the agricultural 
industry without statutory-induced suppression.  This would alleviate 
animal activists’ concerns that they will not be able to obtain and share 
long-term documented footage that shows patterns of prolonged 
animal abuse. 
Still, others argue that even reframing the ag-gag laws will still not 
lead to favorable outcomes, claiming the burden of the laws outweighs 
the benefit.150  These opponents argue that the agricultural industry 
and the state legislatures should make efforts to explain agricultural 
practices to the public, making the industry more transparent and 
shifting the focus from the messenger to the message.151  Nathan 
Runkle, founder and president of Mercy for Animals, said, “[t]he 
industry should be teaming up with organizations like ours to put 
cameras in these facilities, to advocate for mandatory training and have 
real euthanasia policies, things that would allow the public to trust 
these operations rather than fear them.”152  Perhaps the impending 
litigation surrounding ag-gag laws will inspire these facilities to 
reevaluate their policies surrounding animal abuse. 
 
 
 150  See Liptak, supra note 8, at 1176. 
 151  Id. 
 152  Hobson, supra note 16. 
